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Trouble in Paradise—a disabled
person’s right to the satisfaction of
a self-de ned need: some
conceptual and practical problems
PETER HANDLEY
School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ,
UK
ABSTRACT This paper questions the usefulness of the rights-based approach to ameliorat-
ing the social situation of disabled people in Britain and advances two criticisms. First, that
rights and self-de ned needs have been under-theorised by disability theorists to the extent
that they have insuf ciently appreciated the problems that these approaches pose. The paper
suggests that rights to appropriate resources to satisfy self-de ned needs will generate vast
numbers of competing rights claims and that the resulting tendency of rights to con ict has
been under-appreciated. Secondly, that there has been little consideration of how these
con icts might be reconciled.
The  rst two sections of the paper look at the concepts of ascribed and self-de ned needs,
respectively, whilst the  nal one looks at some of the problems of the rights approach and
some of the dif culties of making self-de ned need the basis of rights claims.
Introduction
It has become the orthodoxy among British writers in the  eld of disability studies
to put forward their claims to the greater social and political empowerment of
disabled people almost entirely in terms of rights (Oliver, 1996; Barnes, 1991). This
orthodoxy demonstrates the widespread belief that the way forward for disabled
people in the UK should be guided by and would bene t from the civil rights
approach employed in the USA as embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (Gooding, 1994). Britain now, of course, has its own disability legislation
which is routinely criticised for its rather narrow scope in the shape of the Disability
Discrimination Act (1995). The crux of this criticism is that British legislation is
based not upon rights, as in the American case, but upon needs. To be more precise,
it is seen as being based upon one particular form of need, namely ascribed need
which it is suggested actively hinders rather than helps the empowerment of disabled
people. Consequently, a signi cant majority of British academics and activists see
ISSN 0968-7599 (print)/ISSN 1360-0508(online)/00/020313-13
Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
as
t A
ng
lia
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
7:0
5 0
3 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
12
 
314 P. Handley
the way ahead as one  rmly rooted in the American rights-based approach. How-
ever, this approach too relies upon another conception of need, namely self-de ned
need.
‘Trouble in Paradise’ refers to what the author regards as the probable outcome
of an unre ective dependence upon the concept of rights and the usefulness of
attempting to establish a claim for rights on the similarly misunderstood concept of
self-de ned need as suggested by Michael Oliver in his in uential book, Understand-
ing Disability: from theory to practice. Rather than representing a metaphorical ‘par-
adise’ though a rights-based approach may result in something rather more
troublesome. I advance two fundamental criticisms of it. The  rst of these is that the
issues of rights and self-de ned needs have been under-theorised by disability
theorists to the extent that they have not appreciated the practical and theoretical
problems that a reliance upon such a strategy poses; the tendency of rights to
con ict has been under-appreciated. The second problem is that consequently they
have not considered suf ciently how these con icts might be reconciled to the
bene t of disabled people.
In the  rst two sections of this paper the concepts of ascribed-need and
self-de ned need are analysed in order to draw out the reasons for the preference of
the latter over the former. In the  nal section, the concept of rights is examined
along with the problems that this poses for those who wish to make self-de ned need
the basis of rights claims.
The Critique of Ascribed Need
In Understanding Disability Michael Oliver argues that any hopes for the greater
social and political inclusion and empowerment of disabled people will continue to
be thwarted by continued attempts at making provision for empowerment on the
basis of need. Speci cally, he argues that it is one particular conception of need,
ascribed need, that underlies all current measures in the UK designed to improve the
situation of disabled people and that this conception in fact actively disempowers
them (Oliver, 1996, p. 52).
Why does Oliver see this conception of need as so inadequate to the task of
empowering disabled people? The argument is simple and familiar enough. Oliver
argues that the act of ascription lies with persons considered to be expert in their
respective  elds and who are thus quali ed to undertake such assessments (Oliver,
1996, p. 44). So bearing this in mind the stereotypical scenario sees the disabled
person being assessed by a number of such experts, who might include at various
times and in various situations, local authority community care personnel, and most
likely and crucially, a member of the medical profession. It is on the basis of the
information that these experts supply that individual disabled people have their
needs ascribed to them.
Oliver suggests that in having their needs ascribed to them in this manner
disabled people are being sidelined from a process the outcomes of which have the
greatest signi cance for their daily lives. Disabled people’s opinions about the
conditions that they have and on what services, facilities and so on that they consider
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Trouble in Paradise 315
necessary to tangibly enhance a feeling of empowerment are rarely, if ever, sought.
He continues that although such feelings of disempowerment constitute an experi-
ence not unfamiliar to many others in society it is especially true in the case of the
disabled who are ‘traditionally’ viewed as being able to do little, if anything, for
themselves as the tragic victims of circumstance (Oliver, 1996, p. 32). In summary
the upshot of all this is that:
1. Rather than empowering disabled people and enhancing their autonomy,
ascribed need contributes to dis-empowerment by neglecting the role that
disabled people should play in planning their own lives on the basis of what
they see themselves as needing.
2. Consequently, ascribed need only maintains and enhances society’s existing
power structures, which oppress disabled people by ensuring their depen-
dence upon others and exacerbating their powerlessness. Moreover, it also
tends to reproduce a culture of dependence, from which it is dif cult, if not
impossible to escape.
3. Consequently, it tends to keep disabled people marginal to the rest of society
with all the attendant problems this involves, such as poverty and inferior
educational and employment opportunities.
There is a good deal of intuitive appeal to such a critique. Additionally, it raises
relevant and important issues that others have also noted concerning the actual
outcomes of welfare policies (Pierson, 1991, p. 48). In some general sense, it is an
appealing idea to assert as much empowerment over our lives as we possibly can. It
is quite probably true to say that few people like to be told what to do with their lives
too often or how to live them, let alone be told what they need to make their lives
liveable and worthwhile. However, it is clearly the case that this is what many
disabled people still face on an almost daily basis: living a life that is decided for
them by people who are rarely accountable and who primarily act in their own
interests (Oliver, 1996, p. 65). Empowerment, is clearly compromised to an extent
in a process that reduces opportunities for disabled people to choose their own
life-plans based on a purportedly objecti ed conception of need.
Thus, a part of Oliver’s concern is to diminish the role of experts in the daily
life of disabled people, to do away with ascriptions of need and instead take greater
account of the self-de ned needs of disabled people. He suggests that it is in this way
that autonomy will become more meaningful and result in the greater empowerment
of disabled people.
However, it should be said that Oliver portrays empowerment as something of
a zero-sum game for all disabled people, where all the advantages rest with experts
and the able-bodied more generally at the total expense of the disabled irrespective
of the nature and extent of their impairments. Oliver appears to visualise disabled
people’s autonomy (or rather the lack of it) against some sort of idealised norm for
the able-bodied who are seen as rarely (perhaps even never?) being the recipients of
ascription and therefore as possessing an almost immeasurable degree of autonomy.
In Mary Ann Glendon’s words they (the autonomous able-bodied) appear ‘to be
completely free, to possess things totally, to be masters of [their] fate’ (Glendon,
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316 P. Handley
1998, p. 113). If this is the notion that wants to be conveyed then it is clearly
unrealistic. We are all only autonomous to varying degrees, and we are all practically
interdependent upon others in all sorts of ways which, if the goal of social inclusion
is to make any sense at all, ought to be acknowledged (Reindal, 1999). To talk of
social inclusion implies inter-dependence. Instead, Oliver makes little of this and
relies upon blunt assertions of an ‘all or nothing’ conception of autonomy.
It is readily apparent that much of this criticism of ascribed need and the
consequent diminution of autonomy recalls Libertarian criticisms of the effects of
welfare states. These concerns crystallise around a number of core concepts familiar
in classical liberal political theory, the most important of which are the centrality of
the self-directing individual within a recognisable private domain (Hayek, 1979, vol.
2, p. 28), and the importance and indeed moral rectitude of individuals as auton-
omous choosers of their own ends free from the constraints and interventions of
government (Barry, 1986). The active Libertarian sees herself engaged in a process
of liberation and wages war on all institutions through which a human being’s vision
of the world is narrowed through conformity to them. Thus, the welfare state is
attacked for negating the choices of individuals by imposing a set of values deter-
mined by some body other than the self.
Such pre-determination of an individual’s ends is anathema to the Libertarian
to whom such processes represent the machinations of an interventionist state
(Bellamy, 1992, p. 222; Barry, 1987). Thus, to return to the issue of disabled people
and welfare provision, a Libertarian analysis would highlight the diminution of
autonomy and the coercive imposition of a particular conception of what constitutes
need. For many though the issue of need has been central to debates about welfare,
however the constraints of space merely allow me to note that importance here
without examining it in greater depth (Doyal & Gough, 1991; Braybrooke, 1987;
Plant et al., 1980).
So, to brie y recapitulate. It is one particular sort of need, ascribed need, that
Oliver is critical of and which, he argues, ought to give way to self-de ned need.
However, it is not his critique of ascribed need that worries me unduly, rather it is
his prescription of a greater reliance upon self-de ned need and it is to that that I
now turn to.
The Argument for Self-de ned Need
Oliver suggests that his preferred conception of self-de ned need is compatible with
and can form the basis of rights claims. In practical terms this translates into the idea
that disabled people ought to be more involved than they currently are in needs
assessment exercises and that their self-de ned needs ought to count for a good deal
more than they currently tend to. One can see the merit in this type of prescription
and the possible consequences for the increased empowerment and autonomy of
disabled people.
However, such an approach presents awkward problems. Oliver is vague about
how self-de ned-need would translate into practically workable solutions. If ascrip-
tion has any bene ts at all then its claimed objectivity must surely be one of them
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Trouble in Paradise 317
inasmuch as it does make policies practically workable despite the drawbacks that
have already been identi ed. However, to go back to our hypothetical stereotypical
disabled person for a moment it is illustrative to see how self-de ned need might
affect the assessment procedure. Rather than the disabled person merely acting as a
passive recipient of ascription, the new scenario would presumably see the individual
being asked exactly what it is that they require to make their life tolerable and
liveable, their answers being used as the basis for action and the allocation of
appropriate resources. The individual’s autonomy would thus be enhanced on the
basis that whatever resources she/he received in return would accurately re ect
her/his speci c needs.
Oliver leaves us guessing as to whether any ascription at all should form a part
of this process, or whether allocations should rest entirely on self-de ned need. On
the basis of his own words though it appears likely that Oliver favours the latter
course. He says that ‘it is rights to appropriate [welfare services to meet] their own
self-de ned needs that disabled people are demanding, not to have their needs de ned
and met by others’ (Oliver, 1996, p. 74, emphasis added). Although acknowledging
that there have been some bene ts of needs-based provision for disabled people
Oliver continues that there has been a price to pay. An ‘invasion of privacy by a
veritable army of professionals’, who offer ‘services that the state thinks you should
have or is willing to pay for, rather than those that you know that you need (Oliver,
1996, p. 69, emphasis added). Surely, however, even admitting that many disabled
people’s lives are constrained in many more ways than those of many able-bodied
people interactions with professionals of all sorts cannot be avoided. For although
we are able to meet some needs by ourselves there are many more that we cannot,
and which thus have to be met by someone or something. For example, by some
other individual or group of individuals, or by the state or through market mecha-
nisms.
It is here that problems begin to emerge with the attempt to make self-de ned
needs the basis of rights claims. First, at no point does Oliver attempt to specify what
these self-de ned needs might consist in. Of course, he cannot do this for the simple
reason that our self-de ned needs are personal to us as individuals. In fact,
self-de ned need in the sense that Oliver seems to suggest appears to be rather too
close to our wants or preferences or at least it runs the risk of being interpreted in
that way. Indeed, as Jerome Bickenbach points out, ‘Needs overlap imperceptibly
with preferences, and preferences know no boundaries’ (Bickenbach, 1993, p. 199).
For the Libertarian, wants and preferences are the only means of distributing
resources on the grounds that they have the virtue of being empirically veri able. As
Maureen Ramsay puts it, ‘To say someone has a want or preference is to state a fact
since what one wants can be shown to exist’ (Ramsay, 1998, p 223). That is to say,
that we can discover people’s wants and felt-needs, as Ramsay calls them by
observing what people do thus dispensing with the metaphysical assumptions that
Libertarians believe underpin theories of need.
Basing rights claims upon our wants and preferences seems dubious to say the
least, and risks undermining the concept of rights altogether. To illustrate, one
might continually express one’s self-de ned need to visit friends and family in
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318 P. Handley
Australia, or to dine out three nights a week on smoked salmon and the  nest
champagne, but to claim these as one’s needs to which one ought to have a right to
their satisfaction is absurd. Surely this is so even if one could, and one quite
plausibly could, mount a persuasive argument that one needs these things for the
positive mental bene ts that they might bring in terms of feelings of well-being.
Admittedly, this is stretching the point to absurd proportions, but the purpose of
doing so is to illustrate how self-de ned need when asserted as stridently as it is here,
appears to be an entirely subjective notion, and sounds uncomfortably close to want
or preference. Moreover, in practical terms it may prove dif cult to separate and
identify want or preference from self-de ned need as clearly as Oliver seems to imply
is possible without his actually addressing the issue.
A second point thus directly arises out of the  rst. Namely, that if everyone is
demanding the satisfaction of their self-de ned needs by right, then how are we to
sort out the almost inevitable con icts that this will generate? How are we to
prioritise all of these competing claims, and who will arbitrate between them? Rather
than such a right being the means to further the disabled movements agenda, if we
are to follow such a strategy we should end up no further forward at all, only  nding
ourselves caught up in a morass of competing claims. Not only would disabled
people be competing among themselves for resources to have their self-de ned
needs satis ed by right, for example, those of disabled people with cognitive
impairments and of those with physical impairments, but they would  nd them-
selves competing with the able-bodied who surely have equally legitimate rights to
have their own claims to self-de ned needs satis ed. This begs the question though,
would this be an equal right for all, irrespective of impairment or would it be a special
right of the disabled only?
I now move on to discuss some of the problems that this leaves the argument
for self-de ned need facing if it is insisted that we attach a rights claim to the
satisfaction of such a need.
The Problem of Rights
There is little doubt that many disabled people do face persistent discrimination and
some of the worst social conditions in modern Britain (Barnes, 1991; Drake, 1999).
It is thus dif cult to deny the justice of the disability movement’s desire to remedy
this situation as far as possible and I should make it clear that I do not seek to deny
this at all. However, such is the apparent desperation with which the concept of
rights has been grasped that it brings to mind the image of someone drowning
clutching at straws. This is understandable in part. It has been argued for example
that rights have been bene cial in the advances that women have made over the past
thirty years or so in modern societies (Schneider, 1986). However, even a cursory
glance at a good deal of disability literature illustrates the apparently widespread
conviction, based chie y on an absence of any real counter-argument, that rights are
the last best hope for disabled people, and that to even consider suggesting otherwise
would amount to heresy. However, this is in part, and I stress in part, exactly what
is being suggested.
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Trouble in Paradise 319
As I have already suggested, Oliver does not fully discuss the concept of rights
so much as assert it. The concept is adopted uncritically and it remains an open
question as to whether or not such a reliance is well founded or whether it can
‘deliver the goods’. It should be clearly stated then that this paper doubts the ef cacy
of rights to achieve the ends that are expected of them by the disability movement.
This in itself is nothing new and I acknowledge the work completed on the subject
of rights by feminist writers in particular (Smart, 1989; Wolgast, 1980). However,
these doubts have not been as widely dispersed in the disability movement as they
have been in the women’s movement. The author’s own doubts rest on what he sees
as the confused understanding among many writers as to what rights actually are. A
good example is the use of the term rights itself. The terms basic human rights,
equal rights and legal rights are frequently used interchangeably as if they amount
to one and the same thing. Thus, we are left to speculate what sort of rights are
considered speci cally suited to the satisfaction of self-de ned need; will they be
rights that last in perpetuity, perhaps of the sort commonly known in the advanced
liberal democracies as civil and political rights; or will they be ‘special’ or compen-
satory rights, a temporary measure to correct past injustices done to disabled people,
which when recti ed will be nulli ed? and which have sometimes have been lumped
together under the heading social and economic rights.
Talking of civil and political, and social and economic rights though doesn’t get
us much further here; we need to outline an even more basic distinction that allows
us to identify different types of right. In Anglo-American philosophy, as the promi-
nent Italian theorist Bobbio reminds us, rights are seen as falling into the two broad,
yet distinct camps of moral and legal rights (Bobbio, 1991, p. 56), or if one prefers
things that ‘ought to be’ rights and things ‘that are’ rights. Bearing this in mind we
can see the fundamental difference between Human Rights, as universalised moral
claims, and which include civil, political, social and economic rights on the one
hand, and legal rights as speci c legal instruments established by the political
systems of nation states enshrining these human rights as positive law on the other.
However, it is in terms of fundamental human rights that the majority of rights
claims are made and this is particularly true for those previously unrecognised claims
that seek formal recognition, for example that of Shakespeare et al. (1996) concern-
ing the sexual rights of disabled people. Appealing to human rights is an understand-
able strategy for it has the effect of imbuing the claim with authenticity, legitimacy
and a sense of overwhelming importance as Carl Wellman has suggested (Wellman,
1999, p 2). However, it is this sense of overwhelming importance, typically ex-
pressed in terms of strident demands, which is increasingly being attached to a
growing number of rights claims. Such a strategy threatens to pose considerable
problems.
However, before looking at some of these problems I want to let two prominent
liberals, Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, illustrate the potential effectiveness
of a human rights-based strategy and the overwhelming importance of claiming
something by right. For Waldron, ‘Rights express limits on what can be done to
individuals for the sake of the greater bene t of others; they impose limits on the
sacri ces that can be demanded from them as a general contribution to the general
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320 P. Handley
good … Rights are designed to pick out those interests of ours that are not to be
traded off against the interests of others’ (Waldron, 1993, p. 209). Dworkin echoes
Waldron’s sentiments in his well-known representation of rights as ‘trump-cards’,
which are to be played only in the last resort to protect the basis of our freedom and
well-being (Dworkin, 1977, p. XI).
The idea of ring-fencing areas of our lives is certainly seductive as I have
previously suggested, even more so for disabled people in the face of the repeated
invasions by experts. The sort of right that is being talked about here in this context
is a ‘freedom from’ right, that is to say freedom from the unwanted intrusions of
experts-a classical liberal moral right and one with which most Libertarians would
feel comfortable. Libertarians would however be troubled by any kind of right to
‘appropriate welfare services’ (Oliver, 1996, p. 74). This is a ‘freedom to’ have or do
something right, which to recapitulate suggests a degree of government intervention
to bring the right about. It potentially requires more than the forbearance of others.
Oliver’s argument then pulls in both directions and tries to encapsulate both a right
to something, and a right from something [within the one claim]. The waters are
muddied further though by the introduction of the concept of self-de ned need
which, as I have already suggested, has a closer af nity with preference than with
objective need so that to suggest that one has a right to a preference sounds
profoundly odd.
Nevertheless, the presumption continues to grow on the part of many groups
that moral rights of these sorts ought to be translated into legal rights if the social
situation of the group is to be ameliorated. Two possible practical problems emerge
though if increasing numbers of ‘new’ moral rights are translated into legal rights.
First, as Cranston suggests with reference to many social and economic rights that
these discredit and undermine moral rights and that their moral force is weakened
(Cranston, 1967) and, secondly, that their ever increasing number will exacerbate
con icts of rights (Wellman, 1999, p. 2).
Bearing this in mind I return to the idea of making resources for the satisfaction
of the self-de ned needs of disabled people the basis of a rights claim. This is a
strategy that requires closer examination. Its probably true to say that disabled
people’s impairments often differ quite considerably and that this is also the case
where people have the same condition but with different degrees of severity. Thus,
the needs that each speci c condition generates will often be speci c in nature.
Thus, given the vast range of impairments and the vast range of needs that are
generated it seems that if we accept the idea of attaching a legal claim for resources
for the satisfaction of all of these needs then the number of separate legal claims that
are generated is potentially limitless. Additionally, if this right is to be an equal right
for all disabled people then all of these legal claims to the resources to satisfy
self-de ned needs will be of equal weight and validity, and presumably if such a right
were to be universalised then it would extend to the able-bodied as equals? Failure
to universalise the right would make it a special right, acknowledging that somehow
the self-de ned needs of disabled people are different and to be accorded a higher
priority than those of others.
Adding self-de nition to the claim only adds further dif culties for underpin-
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Trouble in Paradise 321
ning the argument for the self-de nition of need seems to be the notion that disabled
people know (absolutely and completely) what they need to enhance their life
choices and chances. However, the evidence that individuals do always know what
they need is sketchy as Maureen Ramsay illustrates when she states that, ‘We may
be in need of something without being aware that we need it, we may not know what
we need’ (Ramsay, 1998, p. 229). Indeed, she goes so far as to suggest that, ‘We
may be ignorant or mistaken about what we need, or think that we need something’
(Ramsay, 1998, p. 229), and that ‘needs cannot be inferred from what people say
they need or from what people actually do’ (Ramsay, 1998, p. 229). ‘I can only need
something’, she says, ‘if it is essential to survival and health’ (Ramsay, 1998, p. 230).
Ramsay’s criteria is stringent and if applied to the earlier example of the
Australian holiday  nds it clearly lacking as a case of need even though it is clearly
self-de ned. Indeed, although expressed in terms of a need the Australian holiday is
more properly understood as a preference or a want. Attaching a rights claim to it
does nothing to enhance its credentials for it clearly does not meet the criteria of
Waldron or Dworkin either. On the other hand, we could apply Ramsay’s argument
about knowing what we need to a case suggested by Plant of a person who has
diabetes and yet is unaware of it to illustrate how undesirable it could be to sideline
the concept of ascribed need entirely (Plant, 1991, p. 201). Without some external
assessment of need the person with diabetes may well remain mysti ed at the
symptoms they are experiencing, and ultimately they may suffer irreparable harm
from the failure to take insulin as directed by a medical expert.
One is faced with an old dilemma in the debate between ascribed and self-
de ned need, for there are times when one wants things that one does not actually
need and there are other times when one needs things that one does not want. An
example of the former would be my ‘need’ to dine out three times a week and an
example of the latter might be Plant’s example of the individual with diabetes
reluctant to take the insulin that they know they need to survive. As Michael
Freeden has said ‘a right to what individuals need is not the same as to what they
desire or want’ (Freeden, 1991, p. 49). However, although these needs are different,
it is easy to drift from the one into the other, so that self-de ned
need 5 need 5 want. To suggest, as Oliver does, that these two conceptions of need
are, if not mutually exclusive, then at least clearly de nable avoids complex realities
(Bickenbach, 1993, p. 199). We frequently hear people asserting that they ‘need a
holiday’, for example, or young children claiming that they ‘need’ chocolate bars.
Indeed, they may. However, can we proceed from this to stridently assert a right to
a holiday, to dine out three times a week, to a Mars Bar or even to a loving and
ful lling sexual relationship? This risks con ating preference with need.
The practical problems of recognising such absolute claims as legal rights based
entirely on the individual’s de nition of need poses questions about such an
approach in terms of avoiding and/or ameliorating con icts of rights. As Richard
Dagger suggests the more we appeal to rights the less likely it seems that we will  nd
mutually satisfactory solutions to social and political problems (Dagger, 1997, p. 3).
Beiner, goes further still when he states that ‘part and parcel of rights discourse is
a tendency towards forms of social life that are exclusively adversarial, litigious, and
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322 P. Handley
geared towards modes of self-assertion, whether individuals or collectivities’ (Beiner,
1992, p. 147). Wellman illustrates this notion with the well-known example of the
abortion debate in the United States where, as he says ‘The absoluteness of legal
rights’ has ‘intensi ed and frozen [the] con ict’ (Wellman, 1999, p. 4), and has
‘infected our personal interactions by making them more confrontational’ (Wellman,
1999, p. 168).
Rather than consider such outcomes though Oliver presses the case for compre-
hensive ‘legislation which emphasises civil rights rather than individual needs’
(Barnes & Oliver, 1995, p. 114). The intention here is clearly to press for legislation
that establishes a legal right to resources to meet disabled people’s self-de ned
needs, which can only mean individually self-de ned needs if it is ever to mean
anything in concrete terms.
Oliver asserts that disabled people are denied the rights that other citizens have
long taken for granted and he uses T. H. Marshall’s in uential model to illustrate
the evolution of political, civil and social rights and disabled people’s exclusion from
them (Oliver, 1996, p. 44). Marshall saw rights as progressively integrating larger
and larger numbers of the population into the citizen body. It seems that Oliver
wishes to convey his agreement with Marshall’s general point about the integrative
and positive function of rights, most especially social rights, with reference to
disabled people; however the strident nature of such claims works against this and
rights appear to take on the level of importance and absoluteness that Libertarian
writers such as Robert Nozick (Nozick, 1974, pp. 28–33; cf. Rand, 1964) attach to
them. Despite outlining his argument against the background of Marshall, Oliver’s
conception of rights based upon the self-de nition of disabled people’s need appears
to be one where once they are established the rights are hermetically sealed against
any attempt to interfere with them. Consequently, they resemble Libertarian inde-
feasible rights of non-intervention.
These remarks should not be all that surprising if we recall those I made earlier
concerning Oliver’s critique of existing welfare arrangements. The critique is clearly
reminiscent of Libertarian arguments for overhauling welfare states that came to
prominence in the mid-1980s. On this reading rights are primarily seen as protective
devices rather than the enabling injunctions of Marshall’s thesis. If this is so then the
tendency of rights is to exclude and to limit rather than to integrate. This, as
Michael Freeden has commented, will re ect an ideology of con ict in which people
are potentially hostile to one another (Freeden, 1991, p. 55).
I do not think that exclusion and con ict are outcomes that Oliver seeks at all
and yet given any lack of systematic theorising on the concept of rights such
outcomes are real possibilities if legal rights are asserted as stridently as they tend to
be. Moreover, given Oliver’s antipathy to expert interventions exclusions and
con ict might be regarded as in some sense a functionally desirable strategy.
However, expert interventions are not easily dispensed with. Assuming Oliver and
Barnes are as committed to legal rights as appears to be the case then it seems
unavoidable that disabled people will be as dependent upon another group of
experts that most of the rest of society is dependent upon when it comes to disputes
concerning legal rights; legal professionals, in their many guises.
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Finally, there also need not necessarily be any friction between ascribed need
and self-de ned need either. For example, one can visualise instances where dis-
abled people are involved in a deliberative approach to the assessment of need with
experts negotiating over the two conceptions in an attempt to reach a point where
the disabled individual feels as if their self-de ned needs have been duly taken
account of, and that they have been appraised of the basis upon which any
ascriptions have been made. In his discussion of rights Jerome Bickenbach offers a
realistic, if rather stark conclusion on a solely rights-based approach,
it is extremely unrealistic to suppose that any of the rights of disabled
people will be absolute, or extrinsically unconditional rights, rights that
must be satis ed whatever the costs or consequences. Compromise is
inevitable. (Bickenbach, 1993, p. 230.)
Rather than advancing the debate about the further empowerment of disabled
people in Britain any such strident claim to a right to the satisfaction of self-de ned
seems to pull too far in the other direction risking con ict, rather than conciliation
thus opening up the distinct possibility of ‘Trouble in Paradise’ in the process.
Conclusions
I am not suggesting that rights ought to be abandoned. They are, and indeed ought
to remain, a part of any strategy for political empowerment for the language of rights
is too valuable and forceful to be dispensed with (Minow, 1990, p. 307). What
concerns me is an over-emphasis upon them and given what I have already said
about the satisfaction of individually self-de ned needs, and the multitude of
individual claims that I believe that this would generate I remain sceptical of a
rights-based strategy for advancing the aims of the disability movement in any
solidaristic fashion. Progress will remain partial and episodic.
In a recent article Allison Drewett (Drewett, 1999) describes the practical
problems of the British welfare state in meeting the requirements of disabled people
on the current basis of ascribed need by right in the face of continued  nancial
retrenchment on the part of government (Drewett, 1999, pp. 119–123). Although
Drewett does not discuss self-de ned need, she is concerned with the issue of rights,
the problem of their practical effectiveness and the misinformed nature of the debate
and its lack of theoretical content (Drewett, 1999, pp. 126–127). In the light of what
I have said previously one cannot help but wonder precisely how self-de ned needs
will be met and  nanced by right in a world where the  nancial retrenchment of
governments is now characteristic. Here, then, I have sought to illustrate her latter
concern by highlighting the degree to which various sorts of rights, namely ‘freedom
to’ and ‘freedom from’ rights are used by one author in particular in such a way that
it is dif cult to see how they could be operationalised by attaching them to the rather
slippery concept of self-de ned need. This combined with the over-use of the
language of rights only serves to weaken the concepts moral force and undermines
its practical effectiveness.
Lastly and all to clearly, this is not an exhaustive inquiry into the area of rights
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and of how much can be expected of them. However, it might provide a starting
point for a debate within the  eld of disability studies in the UK that begins to
question far more closely than has formerly been the case what might be called the
dominant ideology of a rights-based approach to bring about social change for
disabled people.
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